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Was Wegner Rejecting Mental Causality? 
 
 
Abstract: Daniel Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation is often misread. His 
aim was not to question the causal effectiveness of conscious mental states like 
intentions. Rather, he attempted to show that our subjective sense of agency is not 
a completely reliable indicator of the actual causality of action, and needs to be 
replaced by more objective means of inquiry. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Wegner’s views on the nature of human action became influential both 
in psychology and in the philosophy of mind and of action. Wegner is 
usually read as defending the thesis that there is no mental causality: 
no conscious mental states are ever among the real causes of the 
corresponding actions.1 Our conscious intentions and other mental 
states only seem to drive and direct our actions. Although conscious 
intentions often precede our actions, in principle they could be 
removed from the chain of events leading to the action execution, 
blocked, or bypassed, and the same result – the same overt action – 
would obtain. 
My claim in this note is that this reading of Wegner is incorrect. 
I admit that Wegner sometimes speaks as if he were rejecting causal 
efficacy of human mental states (we will see instances of this kind 
of talk later). But these claims need to be understood in the context 
of his work on human action. This context reveals that his view of 
mental causality was different. He did not aim to dislodge the 
important commonsense notion that conscious mental states are – at 
least in some cases – among the causes of actions. He says this much 
                                                          
1 This reading is ubiquitous in the literature on Wegner. Recent examples include 
Mele (2009), Schlosser (2012), Lumer (2014), Mele (2014), Baumeister et al. (2018), 
Lavazza (2019), and Mele (2018). 
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at a number of places in his published writings. His negative argument 
was different. He claimed that our subjective sense of being the 
authors of our actions is not quite reliable. 
I will defend my interpretation of Wegner’s theory by first 
making clear what he meant by “conscious will” and what picture of 
human agency he was criticizing. Then, I will proceed to examine the 
claims that seemingly contradict my interpretation. I will show that 
understood in the broader context of his work, the problematic passages 
in his writings can be understood in a way that allows for mental 
causality. I will conclude by indicating what was Wegner’s preferred 
way of investigating the reality of mental causality (of the lack of 
it). 
 
 
2. Wegner on Conscious Will and Apparent Mental Causality 
 
At the core of Wegner’s contribution to the theory of action is the 
distinction between conscious will and empirical will (Wegner, 2012, 
ch. 1). Conscious (or “phenomenal”) will is the subjetively felt sense 
of being the author of an action. It is not a capacity or power to 
produce voluntary actions, as the title may misleadingly suggest. 
Rather, it is a kind of feeling with distinctive phenomenology. Actions 
accompanied by this “authorship emotion” feel “willed”. Those that are 
not so accompanied do not feel like our own actions.2 The empirical 
will, on the other hand, is the sum of causal mechanisms producing 
actions. 
Wegner’s writings on agency are primarily concerned with this 
subjective feeling of being in charge of one’s actions. His main point 
wasn’t that the conscious will does not causally contribute to action 
                                                          
2 In terms of the contemporary neuroscience of action, Wegner’s conscious will is 
the “sense of agency”. As Moore (2016, p. 1) defines it, the sense of agency is “the 
feeling of control over actions and their consequences”. Wegner himself uses the 
term “sense of agency” in Wegner (2004, p. 654). 
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production. That much trivially follows from the fact that it is just 
an accompanying feeling that attaches to some of our actions. Rather, 
he aimed to demonstrate the epistemic unreliability of this feeling, 
and proposed a hypothetical explanation of how it arises in us. 
Wegner’s experimental work supports the unreliability claim by 
showing the various ways in which the feeling of conscious will is 
manipulable. In some circumstances, the feeling of authorship may mark 
an action as mine even if I didn’t cause it to happen. Wegner calls 
such cases the illusions of control. In other circumstances, the 
converse may happen: I may not feel the action as being mine even 
though I causally brought it about. Wegner calls instances of this 
class automatisms. Together, both phenomena form “dissociations 
between exercise of agency and the phenomenology of agency”.3 
Illusions of control and automatisms demonstrate the double 
dissociation of the actual agency and of the subjective feelings of 
agency. The feeling of conscious will is not a completely reliable 
indicator of the real causality of action. But did Wegner want to say 
that our mental states such as intentions are always cut off from the 
action-producing causal chains – from the empirical will?  
Most if not all interpreters believe he did. What is their 
argument? The experiments on the dissociations of the feelings of 
conscious will from the real agency alone cannot be sufficient. Such 
dissociations only manifest the manipulability of the agentive 
feelings but cannot constitute a proof that no conscious mental state 
ever contributes to action production. I believe it was Wegner’s theory 
of “apparent mental causality” what persuaded the interpreters that 
Wegner aims to dislodge mental causality. 
Wegner did not only demonstrate the manipulability of the sense 
of action authorship. He also proposed a speculative view as to how 
this feeling arises in us: the theory of apparent mental causality 
                                                          
3 See the account and examples of illusions of control and automatisms in Wegner 
(2000, chs. 1, 3 and 4). 
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(AMC for short). According to the theory, the feeling of agency arises 
as a result of an inferential process. The feeling is dependent on 
three conditions: (1) the action followed our conscious thought (the 
condition of priority), (2) there was a match in content between the 
thought and the action (the condition of consistency), and (3) we are 
not aware of any competing cause (or causes) of the action (the 
condition of exclusivity; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). Whenever all the 
three conditions obtain, we make an inference that we are the causal 
source of the action, and the feeling of agency appears. 
 
 
3. Interpreting the AMC Theory 
 
So far, the AMC theory is just a theory about how a certain distinctive 
feeling arises in us when we act, or seemingly act. However, Wegner 
and Wheatley summarized the AMC theory with a figure that, I believe, 
is directly responsible for much of the interpretive confusion: 
 
 
Fig. 1. Reprinted from Wegner (2003) 
 
The problem with this picture is that it seems to put forward a general 
theory of action production. In particular, the theory seems to exclude 
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all conscious mental states from action production. In the AMC schema, 
Wegner seems to have left the circumscribed theory of how agentive 
feelings arise, and entered the metaphysical debate about mental 
causation. However, I think that this interpretation of his motives 
should be resisted. 
I suggest that we must interpret Wegner’s picture of AMC in the 
broader context of his writings on action. This broader context makes 
it clear that Wegner believed conscious mental states may be causally 
contributing towards actions. To begin with, this is how Wegner 
characterizes the empirical will, the collection of causally 
sufficient mechanisms of action: 
 
“Each of our actions is really the culmination of an intricate set of 
physical and mental processes, including psychological mechanisms that 
correspond to the traditional concept of will, in that they involve 
linkages between our thoughts and our actions.” (Wegner, 2002, p. 27; 
both emphases added). 
 
Earlier in the same book, empirical will is said to involve causal 
relations between “people’s thoughts, beliefs, intentions, plans, or 
other conscious psychological states and their subsequent actions” 
(Wegner, 2002, p. 15). Would anyone not familiar with the AMC theory 
come to conclusion that Wegner is rejecting mental causality upon 
reading these words? I doubt it. Wegner seems to accept not just the 
bare possibility, but also the reality of mental causation.  
Other passages in his writings tell the same story. In his 2003 article 
The mind’s best trick he reproduces the AMC schema from his earlier 
writings, but immediately adds the proviso: “Does all this mean that 
conscious thought does not cause action? It does not mean this at all” 
(Wegner, 2003, p. 68). As if Wegner was aware of the danger that people 
will read his theory as a defense of the epiphenomenality of conscious 
mental states, he hastens to fend this reading off. In his 2005 paper 
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Who is the controller of controlled processes? we read the following 
words to the same effect:  
 
“Questions of whether thought actually does cause action, for example, 
have been left in peace, and the issue of the role of consciousness 
in the causation of action has been ignored as well. This is because 
the focus […] is the experience of conscious will, not the operation 
of the will” (Wegner, 2005, p. 32). 
 
Finally, in replies to the critics of his book The Illusion of the 
Conscious Will, he seems genuinely puzzled why people think he was 
proposing a general theory of the causal relations between conscious 
thought and action (Wegner, 2004, p. 683). 
Not all interpreters missed these important passages. For 
instance, Lumer (2014, p. 111f.) draws attention to some of them.4 But 
because he believes that Wegner was really denying mental causation, 
he is perplexed by what looks to him as ad hoc retractions. In my 
view, the quoted passages do express Wegner’s true views on mental 
causality. The challenge is therefore to show that the AMC picture 
does not contradict the possibility of real mental causality. 
There is no denying that the AMC picture is unfortunate. It does 
seems to exclude conscious mental states from action causality. Still, 
we need to keep in mind that Wegner was consistently proposing the AMC 
theory as the explanation of how the agentive feelings arise, not of 
the empirical will. It cannot be stressed enough that Wegner never 
meant to propose a general theory of action production, let alone a 
theory that would exclude all conscious states from the mechanisms of 
the empirical will. The AMC theory is a theory about how the causality 
of action appears to a subject. It is literally a theory of apparent 
mental causality. Apparent mental causation, for Wegner, is an 
inferential proces, as we have seen. It depends on the fulfillment of 
                                                          
4 See also Schlosser (2012, p. 139), and Walter (2014, p. 2222, fn. 8). 
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the three conditions of priority, consistency and exclusivity. The 
fact and mechanisms of apparent mental causality in no way put the 
causal efficacy of mental states in doubt. On the contrary, apparent 
mental causation is “fundamentally separate from the mechanistic 
process of real mental causation” (Wegner, 2002, p. 97; emphasis 
added). This would be an extremely odd way of arguing if Wegner did 
not believe that there is at least a possibility of real mental 
causality. 
 
 
4. From Apparent Mental Causality to Real Mental Causality 
 
To repeat, Wegner focuses on the subjective feeling of the conscious 
will, and tries to show that it is not a completely reliable indicator 
of real action causality. Because of this epistemic unreliability of 
the conscious will, Wegner suggests, we must use other means to 
determine whether and how conscious mental states contribute to action 
causality.5 He writes:  
 
“If the feeling of conscious will is not authentic, can thought still 
cause action? Of course it can. The idea that the experience of 
conscious will is a poor indicator of a causal relation between mind 
and action is not the same as saying that mind does not have a causal 
relationship to action. It could, and in fact we all should be fairly 
certain that it does” (Wegner, 2004, p. 683). 
 
Wegner’s positive proposal is that we use the standard scientific 
procedures of psychology to determine the actual contribution of 
                                                          
5 Note, though, that Wegner does not claim that the feeling of conscious will is 
always illusory; only that it sometimes is. Often, the feelings of agency are 
veridical, tracking the actions that we do in fact cause (Wegner, 2002, p. 97; 
Wegner, 2004, pp. 10 and 35). That is, the feelings can be veridical even if they 
are not appropriately causally hooked up with the systems actually producing actions. 
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conscious intentions to action. That is, we need to determine “the 
causality of the person’s conscious thoughts as established by a 
scientific analysis of their covariation with the person’s behaviour” 
(Wegner, 2002, p. 14). The way to do it is to treat conscious intentions 
and other conscious mental states related to action as variables. We 
test the subject in situations where these states are present and when 
they are absent. If the absence of the mental state causes a 
significant difference in the quality of the subject’s performance, 
we can conclude that the state causally contributed to the subject’s 
actions. 
This view is provocative in that it refuses to take folk-
psychological attributions of action causality at face value. But it 
is in no way a denial of the possibility of real mental causality. On 
the contrary, the scientific procedure may allow us to establish the 
reality of mental causation in a very strong, objective sense. A 
neurophysiological study of Zschorlich and Köhling (2013) provides an 
example of how this can be done in practice. Zschorlich and Köhling 
used Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation to test the causal role of 
conscious intention in wrist movements. The intention was 
operationalized as a conscious effort to produce a specific movement. 
Their results speak in favour of a strong causal role of proximal 
conscious intentions in behavior.6 
 This is not to deny that the causal role of conscious proximal 
intentions in action is probably quite limited. The subjective 
accessibility of conscious intentions may seduce us to believe that 
conscious mental states produce actions directly. The picture is that 
we consciously intend to do something, and the action follows 
automatically, without the need of the intervening neural mechanisms. 
Wegner would deny this simple picture of real mental causality. We do 
not “internally perceive” how our mental states cause our actions. 
                                                          
6 Wegner (2004, 36) mentions a couple of earlier scientific attempts to prove the 
causal effectiveness of conscious intentions. 
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Mental causality can be real in the sense that mental states can 
sometimes become a part of the causal nexus of action producing forces. 
But this causal nexus is a massively complicated business involving a 
plethora of neural mechanisms. Most of this complex machinery operates 
below the radar of consciousness. Conscious intentions, decisions etc. 
are at best only a small part of this vast machinery. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Wegner is often thought to present a great obstacle to the defences 
of mental causality. If my reading of Wegner is correct, these worries 
are misplaced: he was not questioning the reality of mental causality. 
His writings explore the subjective feeling of agency, not the 
underlying causality of human action. My overall impression is that 
Wegner would not be surprised in the least if it turned out, thanks 
to science, that our mental states are often causally effective. 
The advantage of my reading is that it allows one to interpret 
Wegner as a consistent thinker. The opposite, common reading of Wegner 
as the denier of mental causality paints a picture of Wegner as a 
theorist who rejected all mental causality, but every now and then 
irrationally remarked that he was not denying mental causation at all. 
I believe an interpretation that allows the author to be reasonably 
consistent is preferable to the intepretation that makes her or him 
deeply irrational. 
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